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ALBERT E. UTTON*

Which Rule Should Prevail in
International Water Disputes: That of
Reasonableness or that of No Harm?
ABSTRACT
The proposed rules of the InternationalLaw Commission reflect a
clash between the establisheddoctrineof equitableutilization and the
rule of "no significant harm." The doctrine of equitable utilization
developed out of water quantity allocations whereas the "no
sgificant harm" rule has its origins in environmental protection.
TLC rules attempt an accommodation of the two approaches,but
in so doing, nonetheless, the concepts of reasonableness and the
equitable consideration of all factors may be lost. This article
suggests anotheralternativein order to preserve the idea of equitable
balancing to some degree.
After 20 years of labor, the International Law Commission has promulgated its Draft Articles on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses.' A central debate in the protracted deliberations of the
Commission was whether to give precedence to the doctrine of equitable
utilization with its long established roots in water quantity allocation or
the rule of "no significant harm" with its transboundary pollution
origins.2 The Commission labored to reach an accommodation, and
produced a compromise which will probably not please anyone - neither
the downstream states and environmental community that pushed hard
for a "no transboundary harm rule" nor the upstream states and
international water law community which urged the retention of the
doctrine of equitable utilization.
The articles are to be used by the U.N. as the starting point for
a multilateral water treaty, so at this point it is uncertain what the final
product will be. This paper will argue-that the doctrine of equitable
utilization should be maintained in water quantity matters so as to avoid
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1. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session,
U.N. GAOR, 49 Session, Supp. No.10 at 197, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 1994 (hereinafter 1994 ILC

Report).
2. McCaffrey, Stephen C., An Assessment of the Work of the InternationalLaw Commission,
36 Nat. Resources J. 297, 307 (1996).
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granting a veto to lower riparians and that the "no transboundary harm
rule should be limited to cases of environmental damage".3
The Collision Between the Rules of Water Quantity
and Water Quality
Article 5,6 and 7 are the heart of the matter. Article 5(1) provides
that "Watercourse states shall... utilize an international watercourse in
an equitable and reasonable manner" and Article 6 contains a nonexhaustive list of factors to be considered in determining what is
equitable and reasonable.
This list is consistent with the established practice enunciated by
the Helsinki Rules and interstate judicial decisions going back to Kansas
vs. Wyoming.' Therefore Article 5 and 6 enunciate the classic equitable
utilization idea of considering all relevant factors and balancing the costs
and benefits of a proposed use of international waters. The first paragraph of Article 7 articulates a model "due diligence, no significant
harm" water quality approach. Article 7 provides "Watercourse States
shall exercise due diligence to utilize an international watercourse in such
a way as not to cause significant harm to other watercourse States." Thus
at this point we have a direct clash between the doctrine of "equitable
utilization" of Article 5 and the "no significant harm" rule of Article 7.
This is a collision between the long established customary
international law for allocation of water quantity5 and the "no significant
harm" concept for the protection of water quality. Article 7(2) attempts
an accommodation of these two clashing approaches. Articles 5 and 6 and
Article 7 are a mixing of apples and oranges and to continue the
metaphor Article 7(2) is an attempt to make Hawaiian Punch out of this
mixing. Article 7(2) provides:
(2) Where, despite the exercise of due diligence, significant
harm is caused to another watercourse State, the State whose
use causes the harm shall, in the absence of agreement to such
use, consult with the State suffering harm over:
(a) the extent to which the use has proved equitable and
reasonable taking into account the factors listed in Article 6;
(b) the question of ad hoc adjustments to its utilization,
designed to eliminate or mitigate any such harm caused, and,
when appropriate, the question of compensation.

3. Id.
4. See Albert Utton, 5 Water and Water Rights 049.03(c) (Robert Beck ed., 1991).
5. Id.
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The second paragraph of Article 7 provides a way out of the
impasse-an accommodation which is one of process." A process of
consultation and agreement, and if agreement cannot be reached of
dispute resolution.
This pragmatic accommodation of "equitable utilization" and "no
significant harm" does not dearly indicate which concept is to be given
priority. Professor Stephen McCaffrey, who was special rapporteur for the
Commission during much of the decade of the 80s concludes that "while
it is dear that this paragraph does not entirely solve the problem of
which rule take precedence, it at least strongly suggests that if a state's
use is equitable it should be allowed to continue, even if it causes
significant harm to another state. In' the latter event, the reformation
suggests that the harming state would be obligated to minimize that
harm to the extent possible and to compensate the other state for any
unavoidable harm."7 The Commission in its commentary to the Draft
Articles posits that "the fact that an activity involves significant harm
would not of itself necessarily constitute a basis for barring it."'
Dr. Wouters after reviewing the Helsinki Rules and Articles 5 &
7 of the ILC Draft Articles concludes that the 1994 ILC Draft adopts "the
no significant harm rule as the governing norm of watercourse law."'
She elaborates that the ILC's requirement "not to cause significant harm
remains the governing rule of the entire draft.""0
Thus we have two competing approaches contending for
acceptance by the international community. That of the Helsinki Rules
arising from the customary international law of the allocation of water
quantity, and that of no significant harm with its historical roots in
transboundary pollution. Which approach is followed would make a
difference in determining the legality of a proposed new use by upstream
states. If the proposed use is evaluated under the doctrine of equitable
utilization all relevant factors including significant environmental harm
would be considered in the balancing of costs and benefits to determine
if the new use was equitable and reasonable or not." Under the ILC

approach of Draft Article 7, the requirement that a state exercise due
diligence so as not to cause significant harm to other riparian states

6. McCaffrey supra note 2 at 309.

7. Id.
8. Paragraph 21 of the Commentary to Article 7, 1994. ILC Report at 244.
9. Wouters, Patricia, An Assessment of Recent Developments in InternationalWatercourse

Law Through the Prism of the Substantive Rules Governing Use Allocation. 36 Nat. Resources J.
417, 424 (1996).
10. Id. at 423
11. International Law Association Report of the Fifty-Second Conference held at
Helsinki, 1966, Art. V(2)(k).
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would be the base rule, with the question of whether the use is equitable
and reasonable being a secondary factor to be considered in regard to
"mitigation" and "the question of compensation" in the event "despite
the exercise of due diligence, significant harm Is caused to another
watercourse State ....12
The end result is that we now have two concepts competing for
the bedrock position-equitable utilization of the ILA and the Helsinki
Rules and the "due diligence not to cause significant harm" of the I.L.C.
Draft Articles. The United Nations may resolve this conflict in the
projected convention on non-navigational uses of international watercourses.
A HistoricalPerspective
From the perspective of history we can see that the concept of
"equitable utilization" and its predecessor "equitable apportionment" 13
grew out of the requirement to share equitably the use of the waters of
an international watercourse. Thus, it is principally a water quantity
doctrine.1 ' This doctrine originated as a middle position of reasonableness between the two extremes of the absolute territorial sovereignty
assertions of upstream states and absolute territorial integrity claims of
downstream states. An upstream state under the Harmon Doctrine would
assert that it could use and consume the waters of an international or
interstate river as it wished within its sovereign territory without regard
to co-riparians downstream. 5 A downstream state would assert that it
was entitled to the full undiminished flow of an international river due
to its right of "absolute territorial integrity."16
The middle position of equitable apportionment or equitable
utilization rejected both extremes and required equitable sharing of the
use of an international or interstate river. What was equitable or
reasonable is determined by considering all the relevant factors such as
prior uses, climate, and alternative sources. Thus equitable utilization
allowed the fair sharing of the river by all co-riparians. It prevented the
preemptive use of the river by the upper riparian just because it was
upstream, and it likewise prevented the downstream state from exercising
a veto over any upstream diversion or use of the river. 7 It allowed the
development and use of the river, but in a fair and reasonable manner.

12. Article 7(2).
13. Utton, supra note 4.
14. Id.

15. Id.at §49.01.

16. Idat §49.03(a).
17. Id at §49.05.
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Adopting the later and parallel concept of "no significant harm"
originating from transboundary pollution concerns and superimposing it
on the question of water quantity allocations as the base principle of
international water law would come close to again giving a veto power
to downstream states over proposed uses of international streams by
upstream states, in contrast to the concept of reasonable or equitable
sharing of international water resources required by the doctrine of
equitable utilization.
The ILC in its commentary to Article 7 does say that "the fact
that an activity involves significant harm would not of itself necessarily
constitute a basis for barring it."" However the ILC Commentary does
confirm that "the obligation of due diligence contained in Article 7 sets
the threshold for lawful state activity." 1 And further a state would
violate this due diligence obligation "if it knew or ought to have known
that a particular use.., would cause significant harm to other watercourse states."" In fact Article 21 does deal directly with pollution and
requires due diligence to prevent, reduce and control pollution.2 Article
21(2) is explicitly referred to in the commentary as "a specific application
of the general principles contained in Articles 5 and 7 ."2 Thus the
drafters seemingly made clear that the responsibility to exercise due
diligence to prevent significant harm was not confined to water quality
questions but was intended to apply to "significant damage" more
broadly i.e. water quantity questions as well.
Separatingthe Apples and Oranges
Perhaps the confusion caused by the apparent conflict between
these two contending approaches could have been reduced if the
principle of equitable utilization had been used for water quantity matters
and the "due diligence to avoid significant harm" rule had been used in
water quality matters.? Dr. Wouters concludes that the proposed ILC
Article 7 "reduces the principle of equitable utilization to a mere factor
to be considered in considerations where significant harm has oc-

18. Paragraph 21 of Commentary to Article 7, 1964 Helsinki Report at 244.
19. Paragraph 2(0)(2) to Article 7.
20. Paragraph 5 to Article 7.
21. See Wouters, supra at note 9, at 424.
22. Paragraph 3, Commentary to Article 21(2).
23. Admittedly it is not easy to separate quantity from quality scientifically; for
example, diversions and consumptive use may reduce the quantity of water available for
the dilution of salts thus affecting the salinity and thus quality of water. Asu the
environmental community would not likely be confident that environmental factors would
be valued sufficiently in the balancing of the equities of the Helsinki Rules.
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curred." ' Thus raising the specter of a downstream veto power. She
goes onto say, however, that "the ILC's position with respect to
pollution harm is more stringent than in the general rule in Article 7"
and cites Article 21.2 McCaffrey recognizes that "the critics of equitable
utilization, as the prevailing doctrine are concerned principally... about
its use in the field of pollution (water quality), rather than that of
allocation (water quantity)."
,
Perhaps the contradiction caused by mixing the apples and
oranges of water quantity and water quality doctrines could be clarified
by having water quantity issues governed by Articles 5 and 6 as drafted
in the IC Articles and by amending Article 7 to read as follows:
7 (1) Watercourse States shall exercise due diligence to utilize
an international watercourse in such a way as not to cause
significant harm to the environment or ecosystems of other
watercourse States.
(2) Where, despite the exercise of due diligence, significant harm is caused to the environment or ecosystems of another
watercourse State, the State whose use causes the harm shall,
in the absence of agreement to such use, consult with the State
suffering harm over:
(a) the extent to which the use has proved equitable and
reasonable taking into account the factors listed in Article 6;
(b) the question of ad hoc adjustments to its utilization,
designed to eliminate or mitigate any such harm caused, and,
when appropriate, the question of compensation.'
This would decouple Article 5 and 6 a bit from Article 7, making
it clear that in water quantity issues the doctrine of equitable utilization
would have precedence so that a water project could go forward if on
balance the benefits outweighed the costs. However, if the project or any
other activity caused significant adverse changes in water quality or harm
to ecological systems, then the upstream State would be obliged to
exercise due diligence to avoid the harm, and if nonetheless significant
harm would result, then it would be required to consult with the
downstream State and hopefully reach agreement over the questions of
reasonableness, mitigation and compensation.
This would be consistent with Articles 20 and 21' and would
provide protection, for example, for minimum stream flows required for

24. Wouters supra note 9, at 424.
25. Id.
26. McCaffrey, supra note 2, at 308.
27. New material is underlined.
28. Article 20 provides that "Watercourses States shall, individually or jointly protect
and preserve the ecosystems of international watercourses."
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riverine ecosystems and the ecosystems of estuaries. Non-environmental
harm such as the reduction of quantities of water available to a downstream user would be governed by the concept of reasonableness after
considering all relevant factors. Significant environmental or ecological
harm would be subject to the obligation of due diligence to avoid the
harm and if harm nonetheless occurred consultations regarding mitigation and "where appropriate, the question of compensation." This subtle
change might be said to be much ado about nothing, but it would make
clear that the rule of reasonableness governs water quantity allocations
in the absence of significant environmental harm. For example, in the case
of the reduction in flow due to a diversion for an irrigation project, the
reduction might not have significant detrimental environmental impacts
and thus would be judged on the basis of equity or reasonableness after
balancing the costs and benefits. However, if the reduction significantly
affected water quality by raising salinity levels, or threatened endangered
species by reducing available water quantities below ecologically
necessary minimum stream flows, then the obligations of due diligence,
and mitigation would come into play.
This may be only a nuanced change from the ILC draft, but it
would make clear to the parties that equitable utilization is the base rule
in water quantity questions and the due diligence rule comes into play
only in the case of significant environmental harm. This would tidy up
the present ILC Draft which seems to try apply "due diligence" obligations (and its echoes of best available technology to dean up pollution)
to water quantity issues. McCaffrey wisely counsels that "it is indeed
difficult, and perhaps impossible, to apply the same rule to all kinds of
problems relating
to the non-navigational uses of international water",29
courses . . .
In this way an approach could be preserved in water quantity
allocations which is founded upon equity and reason and based upon a
balancing of all factors, including detrimental effects. This would provide
important guidance to the parties and third party decision makers-to the
parties negotiating an equitable apportionment treaty, and to courts,
arbitrators and other third parties decision makers if the parties could not
reach agreement under the excellent consultation and dispute resolution
provisions of the ILC Draft?'

29. McCaffrey, supra note 2, at 308.
30. See discussion of McCaffrey, supra note 2, at 318.

